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THE STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
This is a negligence action filed by the plaintiff Paul

Litchefeld

against

defendants

Jerry

Cutshaw

dba

Interior

Contracting and Max J. Smith and Max J. Smith & Associates,
Architects.

It is alleged in plaintiff's complaint that the

defendants were negligent in the construction and inspection of
the

plaintiff's

County, Utah.

cabin

located

near

Guardman

Pass,

Wasatch

On April 6, 1986 the roof of the cabin collapsed.

The cabin, contents, furnishings, and personal property were all
damaged.
to

The damages to the structure and the contents amounted

$127,645.29.

negligence

of

It
the

is

alleged

defendants

by

was

the
the

plaintiff
proximate

that

the

cause

of

plaintiff's damages.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

or

about

April

6,

1986

the

plaintiff,

Paul

Litchefeld was the owner of the schick-son cabin near Guardman
Pass, Wasatch County, Utah.

The roof on the cabin collapsed.

The cabin, contents, furnishings, and personal property were all
damaged.

The damages to the structure and the contents amounted

to $127,645.29. (R. 3-4).
As a result of the collapse of the cabin roof, the
plaintiff

commenced

a

lawsuit
1

against

the

defendants

for

negligence in construction and inspection of the cabin. (R. 125).
In response to the plaintiff's summons and complaint,
the

defendants

filed

a

Motion

to

Dismiss

and

a

supporting

Memorandum, together with affidavits of Max A. Smith and Jerry
Cutshaw. (R. 16-31)
The defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Motion
to Dismiss, raises Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5
amended) as a defense to the plaintiff's claim.

(1953 as

That section

prevents recovery of damages from any person on the account of
"furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or
construction

of such improvements to real property more than

seven years after the completion of construction." (R. 25)
The cabin was substantially completed by Thanksgiving,
1978.
was

The collapse of the cabin occurred on April 6, 1986 which

approximately

4 and

a half months after the seven year

statutory period of repose had expired. (R. 2-4 and 19 -22)
Oral argument was held in the Third Judicial District
Court on December 10, 1987.

On February 11, 1988 Judge John A.

Rokich issued a memorandum decision granting defendants' Motion
to Dismiss.

He stated in part ". . .however, the court believes

that plaintiff's

case

is not without merit.

The court has

reservations about its ruling but will follow precedent of the
2

present Utah Case law."

(R. 101-104) (emphasis in original)

The Order of Dismissal was signed on March 8, 1988 by
Judge

John

A.

Rokich,

and

plaintiff on March 30, 1988.

Notice

of

Appeal

was

filed

by

(R. 113-116)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
U.S.

Const,

amend.

XIV,

§

1

by

depriving

plaintiff

equal

protection of laws?
2.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
Utah Const, art. I, § 2 and art. I, § 24 by depriving plaintiff
equal protection of laws?
3.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 by depriving plaintiff access to courts
and redress of injuries?
4.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended), violate
the

Utah

Const,

art. VI,

§

26

forbidding

special

laws or

legislation?
5.

Does the Utah Architects and Builders Statute of

Repose, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) violate the
3

Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 requiring that only one subject to be
clearly expressed in the Statutory Title?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
The

following

statute

should

be

considered

when

determining a resolution of this action:
Laws of Utah 1967, Chapter 218, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-25.5, (1953 as amended).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant contends that the District Court erred in
relying on Good vs. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) which
impliedly upholds the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 7812-25.5 (1953 as amended).

In Berry vs. Beech Air Craft, 717

P. 2d 769 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court found the Products
Liability Statute of Repose unconstitutional because it violated
the Utah Const, art. I, § 11 and art. XVI, § 5.

The Utah

Supreme Court should also find that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
(1953 as amended)

is unconstitutional

in light of the Berry

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5

(1953 as amended) also

decision.

violates U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and Utah Const, art. I § 2
and § 24 by depriving plaintiff equal protection of laws.
appellant
situated

contends
are

the

class

of

people

that

are

The

similarly

architects, contractors, engineers, materialman,
4

suppliers, laborers and owners.
similarly

situated

completion

of

an

since

they

The above individuals are all
all

improvement

have

to

major

real

roles

property.

in the
It

is

unreasonable to classify contractors, architects and engineers
differently from materialman, suppliers, laborers, and owners.
It is unreasonable to confer a grant of immunity from suit to
contractors, architects, and engineers while not conferring the
same privileges to materialman, suppliers, laborers and owners.
The appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
(1953 as amended) is unconstitutional violating the Utah Const,
art. I, § 11
injuries.

depriving appellant access to court and redress of

The Utah Const, art. I, § 11 was relied upon by the

Utah Supreme Court in striking Utah's Product Liability Act.
The appellant has been denied access to the courts of Utah since
period of repose had lapsed before the appellant knew he had a
cause of action.
Utah

Code

Ann.

§

78-12-25.5

(1953

as

amended)

is

unconstitutional since it violates the Utah Const, art. VI, § 26
forbidding special laws or legislation.

The appellants are given

an immunity from suit not granted other individuals.

The above

statute singles out architects, contractors and engineers and
gives them preferential treatment.

5

Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended)
is unconstitutional violating the Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 which
requires

that

only

one subject be clearly

expressed

in the

Statutory Title of legislation.
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS
AMENDED) DOES NOT ACT AS A LIMITATION TO AN
OWNER OR PERSON IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY
The plain language of the statute indicates that it is
not to act as a limitation or apply to any person in actual
possession or control as the owner of the property.

The last two

paragraphs of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) state
as follows:
11

. . . the limitation imposed by this
provision shall not apply to any person in
actual possession and control as owner,
tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at
the time the defective and unsafe condition
of such improvement constitutes the proximate
cause of the injury for which it is proposed
to bring an action.
This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the period otherwise
prescribed by laws of this State for the
bringing of any action."
These last two paragraphs have not been interpreted by
the courts of Utah to the best of the appellants knowledge.
Since the appellant, Paul Lichtefeld, was the actual owner of the
cabin and property when the roof collapsed, it is clear that the

limitation

imposed

by

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5

amended) should not be applicable to him.

(1953 as

The clear language of

the statute states it should not be "construed as extending or
limiting the period otherwise prescribed for the bringing of any
action."

The normal statutory period prescribed by law is found

in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1953) and is three years.
the statutory period which the court should follow.
Ann. 78-12-26

This is

Utah Code

(1953) is the appropriate statute to reference

since damage occurred to the owner not a third party.
Code Ann. Section 78-12-25.5

If Utah

(1953 as amended) is referenced,

then the owner is left without a party to sue for redress of
injuries, since immunity is granted to designers and planners.
Therefore,

the

limitation

imposed

by

this

statute

should not bar the appellant from pursuing a cause of action
against the architect, contractor or related parties.

Appellant

commenced his cause of action timely had the normal statute of
limitation

been

followed,

namely

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-12-26

(1953) .

Consequently, this court should direct this case back

to the District Court reversing Honorable Judge John A. Rokich's
Order of Dismissal.

7

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON GOOD
VS. CHRISTENSEN WHICH IMPLIEDLY UPHOLDS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANN. 78-1225.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
Good vs. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) did not
involve any constitutional analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 78-1225.5 (1953 as amended).

In light of the decision of Berry vs.

Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) the pervasiveness of
Good vs. Christensen should be seriously questioned.
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985)
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Utah Product Liability Act.

The Utah Product Liability Act and

the challenged statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5
amended), are Statutes of Repose.
holding

that

the

Product

(1953 as

The result in Berry was a

Liability

Statute

of

Repose

was

unconstitutional, since it violated Utah Const, art. I, § 11 and
art. XVI, § 5.

The statute provided that Products Liability

actions were barred if filed more than six years after the date
of initial purchase of the product or ten years after the date of
its manufacture despite the date of injury.
in

Berry

vs.

Beech

Aircraft,

717

P.2d

The courts analysis
670

(Utah

1985)

is

applicable to the Architects and Builders Statute of Repose found
8

in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended).

It too should

be found unconstitutional.
A
individual

Statute
a

of

Repose

reasonable

amount

is

not

of

designed

time

to

to

file

allow

an

a lawsuit.

Indeed, as explained in Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670
(Utah 1985) the Court stated:
". . . the Statute of Repose may bar the
filing of a lawsuit even though the cause of
action did not arise until after it was
barred and even though the injured person was
diligent in seeking a judicial remedy."
Berry at 672.
The collapse of the appellants roof, which gives rise to this
lawsuit, occurred approximately four and a half months after the
period

of

repose

had

expired.

This

lawsuit

was

commenced

approximately a year and a half after the collapse of the roof.
This was timely if the normal statutory period in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-26 (1953 as amended) (3 years) were found applicable.
Finally, this Court
Aircraft,

717

P.2d

670

(Utah

stated

1985)

when

in Berrv vs. Beech
reflecting

on the

analysis in Good vs. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) and
held as follows:
" . . . In sustaining the statute, the Court
declined to make any analysis of the
constitutional claims raised. It simply made
the conclusionary statement that the attack
on the constitutionality of the statute was
without merit.
Whether the Court in fact
addressed the merits of Utah Const, art. I, §

11 is speculative, and the
ruling,
therefore, has little pervasive effect here."
Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d at 683.
As will be shown, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as
amended)

also

violates

state

and

federal

constitutional

guarantees.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES U.S. CONST.
AMEND. XIV, § 1 BY DEPRIVING APPELLANT EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAWS
Before

the

challenged

statute

can

be

found

unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection under the
state or the federal constitution, it must first be determined
under what standard of review the legislation is scrutinized.

It

may appear that the mere rationality test, which is the least
probing standard of review, would apply to statutes such as the
challenged

statute,

classifications."

since

it

is

not

based

upon

"suspect

However, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed

a mid level review or test for classifications, for example,
based on gender or illegitimacy.

Craig vs. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,

97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L. Ed.2d 397 (1976).
in cases

involving

access to judicial

Appellant suggests that
process, more

scrutiny should be used other than "mere rationality".
judicial

process

should

be

scrutinized
10

closer

than

probing

Access to
economic

issues,

which

are

However,

as will

stricken

similar

usually

subject

to

mere

rationality.

be shown, other State Supreme Courts have
statutes using the mere

rationality test.

Whether using the mere rationality test or a higher theory of
review,

the

challenged

statute

does

not pass

constitutional

muster.
One of the first cases to strike a statute similar to
Utah's on Equal Protection grounds was Skinner vs. Anderson,
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967).

231

The Illinois Supreme Court struck down a

statute which prohibited an action being filed against any person
who

performed

or

was

furnishing

"the

design,

planning,

supervision of construction or construction of improvements to
real property

if more than four years have passed since the

furnishing of the services."

The reasoning of the Skinner court

was so persuasive that most courts cite to it as the the seminal
decision.

The theory of the case was quoted in Phillips vs. ABC

Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), State Farm and Casualty
Company

vs. All

Henderson

Clay

Electric,

Inc.,

660

P.2d

995

(Nev.

Products vs. Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d

174

1983);
(N.H.

1982), Broome vs. Truluck, 421 S.E.2d 739 (S. C. 1978); Loyal
Order of Moose, vs. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977).

Many

courts have found the language of Skinner vs. Anderson, 231
N.E.2d 588 (111. 1967) to be so persuasive that they have quoted
11

a substantial portion of that decision verbatim.

Any attempts to

condense the highlights of Skinner will necessarily result in a
loss of meaning and clarity.

Therefore, it also merits inclusion

here:
11

. . .If, as the defendant suggests, the
objective of the statute is to require that
trials of actions based upon defects in
construction be held within a relatively
short time after the work is completed, that
objective is achieved only partially, and in
a discriminatory fashion. If the damage or
injury occurs at any time within 4 years
after construction is completed, the time
within which the action must be commenced is
governed by other statutory limitations. In
such cases the time between completion of
construction and the required institution of
suit may well exceed 4 years.
More important is the fact that of all those
whose negligence in connection with the
construction of the improvement to real
estate might result in damage to property or
injury to person more that 4 years after
construction is completed, the statute
singles
out
the architect
and
the
contractor, and grants them immunity. It is
not at all inconceivable that the owner or
person in control of such an improvement
might be held liable for damage or injury
that results from a defective condition for
which the architect or contractor is in fact
responsible. Not only is the owner or person
in control given no immunity; the statute
takes away his action for indemnity against
the architect or contractor.
The arbitrary quality of the statute clearly
appears when we consider that architects and
contractors are not the only persons whose
negligence in the construction of a building
or other improvement made on damage to
12

property or injury to persons.
If, for
example, 4 years after a building is
completed a cornice should fall because the
adhesive
used
was
defective,
the
manufacturer of the adhesive is granted no
immunity. And so it is with all others who
furnish materials used in constructing the
improvement. But if the cornice fell because
of defective design or construction for which
an architect or contractor was responsible,
immunity is granted. It cannot be said that
one event is more likely than the other to
occur within 4 years after construction is
completed.
Of course, section 22 of art. IV does not
prohibit legislative classification.
It
does,
however,
require
that
the
classification be reasonably related to the
that legislative purpose.
And where the
relationship was non existent the statute
has
been
held
to
countervene
the
constitutional provision.
(Citations
omitted.)
That the statutes benefits all
architects and construction contractor is
significant if the benefits conferred upon
them are not denied others similarly
situated. As this article held with respect
to the section 22 of art. IV that the
statute operates uniformly upon all members
of a class created as the beneficiaries of
the act is not the full test to be applied,
but in order to avoid the constitutional
inhibition last above quoted it must also
appear that there is a sound basis, in reason
and principal, for regarding the class of
individuals as a distinct and separate class
for the
purpose
of the
particular
legislation."
Skinner v. Anderson, 231
N.E.2d at 590, 591. (emphasis added)
Probably the most significant statement in Skinner is
the portion emphasized where the court discusses the possibility
that an owner or person in control of an improvement may be held
13

liable

for

condition

damage

for which

responsible.
advances

or

injury

that

results

the architect

from

or contractor

a
is

defective
in fact

This is the exact scenario that the appellant

before

this

court.

The

report of Arnold W.

Coon

(Addendum 1), indicates that in his opinion .the roof of the cabin
was

not

constructed

according

to

design

specifications.

Furthermore, the deviations from the specifications were of such
a nature that the architect should have noticed the deviations
through

periodic

Consequently,

walk
if

through

the

inspections

challenged

of

statute

the
is

premises.
not

found

unconstitutional, the owner will be held responsible for the
contractors and architect's negligence when in fact, the owner
(appellant) had no reason to believe that the roof and structure
were unsound.

No rational argument can be advanced that the

appellant should be held responsible for the latent defects.
Also, no rational argument can be advanced to support
the proposition that owners, tenants, materialman, suppliers, and
laborers should be a separate class from architects, engineers
and

construction

contractors.

All

these

individuals

play

important roles in constructing an improvement to real property.
Many courts have suggested distinctions to justify the
separate

classifications.

First, it

is argued

that owners,

tenants and materialman have continuing control over access to
14

and maintenance of the property.

Klein vs. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d

514 (Mass. 1982), Freezer Storage vs. Armstrong Cork, 382 A.2d
715 (Pa. 1978).
Next, the courts also point to the different treatment
of

owners and tenants at common law; such as the larger class of

potential plaintiffs who may sue design professionals; the legal
theories

available

to

those

defenses

available

only

to

plaintiffs; and
landlords

Storage, 382 A.2d at 718-720.

and

the

common

tenants.

law

Freezer

Others cite the possibility of

defective maintenance and alterations.

Yarbow vs. Hilton Hotels,

655 P.2d 822 (Colo. 1982).
Other justifications

are also cited to support the

distinction between owners, suppliers, materialmen and design
professionals.

One argument is that, because materialmen provide

standard goods manufactured by standard processes, they may be
held

to

higher

quality

control

standards

than

the

design

professional, whose work is often unique and cannot be completely
tested.

Klein, 437 N.E.2d 524; Freezer Storage. 328 A.2d at 719.

In other words, buildings are more complex than their component
parts.

Furthermore, design professionals have special expertise;

they should be encouraged to experiment in their creativity and
should not be stifled.

Klein. 437 N.E.2d at 524; O'Brien vs.

Hazelet and Erdal. 299 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1980).
15

None of these diverse rationals are persuasive.

One

effect of the statute of repose is to eliminate the statutory
right of contribution among tortfeasors.

It follows that when

an unprotected owner is 50% at fault and a protected contractor
is 50% at fault, the unprotected owner would be 100% liable for
all damages, without a remedy for contribution.
repose,

therefore,

does

not

entirely

defective design, but shifts it.

The statute of

abrogate

liability

for

Thus the potential interest of

joint tortfeasors in obtaining contributions, in addition to the
claimants

interest

considered.

in

suing

a

particular

party,

must

be

Since the owner had no knowledge of any latent

defects, its not reasonable or rational that he should be liable
for them.
The Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner Construction Co.
vs.

Scales.

752

P. 2d

arguments in detail.

467

(Ala.

1988)

examined

the

above

In striking the Alaska statute, which is

similar to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended), that
court held:
"There is no substantial rational between
exempting
design professionals
from
liability, shifting liability for defective
design and construction to owners and
material
suppliers, and the goal of
encouraging construction.
The shift of
liability to unprotected parties increases
their incentive to build in corresponding
measure to the increased incentives of
protected parties.
If anything, the dis16

incentive on the part of owners may be
greater than their portional measure of
liability shift, because they may be liable
for a product over which they have no
control.
Moreover, design defects may be
catastrophic, and experimental designs shift
correspondingly greater unknown risk to
owners, giving them even more reason not to
finance construction. Thus, we believe that
the statutory means are not substantially or
relational ly related to the ends.
We
conclude that A.S. 09.10.055 violates the
equal protection clause of the Alaska
Constitution."
Turner Construction Co. v.
Scales, 762 P.2d at 472.
Many courts have stricken similar statutes on federal
equal protection grounds.

They are:

McClanahan vs. American

Gilsonite, 494 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Colo. 1980), State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co., vs. All Electric, Inc.. 660 P.2d 995 (Nev. 1983),
Henderson Clay Products, Inc. vs. Edgar Wood and Associates, Inc.
451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982), Phillips vs. ABC Builders, Inc., 611
P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980), Broome vs. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739 (S.C.
1978), Loyal Order of Moose, vs. Kavness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla.
1977), and Fujioka vs. Kam, 514 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1973) and Shibuya
vs. Architects Hawaii LTD, 647 P.2d 276 (Haw. 1982).
Consequently,

it

is

clear

that

people are not being treated similarly.

similarly

situated

Whether examining the

constitutionality of challenged statute under mere rationally or
a

higher

theory

of

review,

constitutional muster.
17

the

statute

fails

to

pass

POINT IV
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATES UTAH CONST.
ART. I, § 2, AND ART. I, § 24 BY DEPRIVING
APPELLANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
The Utah Const, art. I, § 2 states as follows:
"All political power is inherent in the
people; and all free governments are founded
on their authority for their equal protection
and benefit, and they have the right to alter
or reform their government as a public
welfare require",
Also, Utah Const, art. I, § 24 states as follows:
"All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform application."
Even though Utah Const, art. I, § 2 uses the language
"equal protection" it appears to be a statement of the purpose of
government

more

than

governmental action.

a

legal

standard

used

to

measure

In Liedtke vs. Schettler. 649 P.2d 80 (Utah

1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that Utah Const, art. I, §
24

is

generally

considered

the

equivalent

of

the

equal

protection clause of the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
The most recent state to strike a Architect and Builder
Statute of Repose was the Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner
Construction Co. vs. Scalesf 752 P.2d 467 (Ala. 1988) previously
cited.

In Turner an action was brought against a construction
18

company when a fire destroyed an apartment complex.

The district

court ruled that the 6 year Statute of Repose is unconstitutional
violating the equal protection clause of the state constitution.
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court ruling.

The only

substantial difference between Alaska statute and Utah's is that
the Alaska statute has a 2 year savings clause.
In Turner. the design professionals contended that the
injured

plaintiff's

suggesting

that

lack

they

unprotected defendants.

standing
were

not

to

challenge

members

of

the statute,
the

class

of

Furthermore, the design professionals

contended that the statute is constitutional.
The court stated as follows on the standing issue:
"The injured plaintiffs first constitutional
claim is based upon the rights of thirdparties-potential defendants, such as owners
and tenants, who are not protected by the
statute. Every court which has addressed the
issue has concluded that persons such as the
plaintiffs are proper parties to assert this
claim, because they are precluded from
asserting their own rights against defendants
who might otherwise be liable; the statute
narrows the group against which recovery is
available.
McClanahan vs. American
Gilsonite. 494 F. Supp. 1334, 1342-44 (D. Co.
1980) ; Shibuya vs. Architects Hawaii, 647
P.2d 276, 282 (Haw. 1982).
The injured
plaintiff's interest in invalidating the
statute is as great as that of the
materialmen or the defendant in possession.
Klein vs. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 523
(1982). We find this reasoning persuasive,
therefore, we conclude that the injured
plaintiffs have standing to assert the equal
19

protection.If
Turner Construction
Scales. 752 P.2d at 470.
Likewise, the appellant has
constitutional challenges raised.
class

of

unprotected

Co,

v.

standing to assert the

He is in fact a member of a

plaintiffs,

namely

other

owners.

Consequently, there is no standing issue to be addressed.
The Utah Const, art. I, § 24 protects against two types
of discrimination.

First, the law must apply equally to all

persons within a class.

Second, the statutory classifications

and the different treatment given the classes must be based on
differences

that

have

a

reasonable

objective of the statute.

tendency

to

further

the

Malan vs. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670

(Utah 1984).
If
statutory

the

relationship

objectives

are

of

the

classification

unreasonable

or

to

the

fanciful,

the

discrimination is unreasonable.
Utah's

Architects

and

Builders

statute

of

repose

classifies defendants based on their occupation or the nature of
the work they perform.

It classifies plaintiffs based on the

time of their injury.

Neither of these two categories are a

suspect class.
particular

The right asserted is the interest in suing a

party,

which

is not

a

fundamental

constitutional

right; nevertheless, the interest in redressing wrongs through
the

judicial

process

is

a

significant
20

one.

Wilson

vs.

Municipality of Anchorage, 669 P.2d 569, 572 (Ala. 1983).
The Supreme

Court

in recent years

appears to have

altered the standard of review for regulating the exercise of a
fundamental constitutional right.

In many cases, the Court still

maintains that it will employ strict scrutiny when the government
allocates the ability to exercise fundamental rights differently
among various classifications of persons.

The identification of

a right as "fundamental" is a substantive decision unrelated to
equal protection or technical standards of review.

However, the

court in the 1960's and early 1970fs had indicated that laws
making differentiations between persons exercising

fundamental

rights would be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and would not
be upheld unless the government could demonstrate that it was
necessary for it to use the classification in order to promote a
compelling state interest.

Loving vs. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87

S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed.2d 1010

(1967)

(marriage); Kramer vs.

Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L.
Ed.2d 583 (1969) (voting); Shapiro vs. Thompson.

394 U.S. 618,

89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed.2d 600 (1969) (interstate travel); Dunn
vs. Blumstein. 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed.2d 274
(1972) (travel and voting).
As a consequence, access to the Courts of Utah and
redress of injuries as constitutionally guaranteed in the Utah
21

Const, art. I, § 11 should at least be subject to the mid level
standard of review.

Craig vs. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197; 97 S.Ct.

451, 50 L. Ed.2d 397 (1976).

The court should find that there

is no substantial reason for the exempting design professionals
from liability while failing to protect owners, materialman and
suppliers who are similarly situated.
objective

can

be

classification.

served

by

making

No important governmental
such

a

discriminatory

Consequently, this court should hold Utah Code

Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) unconstitutional as did the
Supreme Court of Alaska in Turner Construction Co. vs. Scales,
752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988).
In Henderson Clay Products vs. Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d 174
(N.H.

1982) the owner

against

a

department

supplier
store

disintegrating.
and

the

were

bricks
peeling,

alleging

the

bricks

falling

apart

and

on

the

generally

The Superior Court granted the motion to dismiss

supplier

Superior Court.

of

of a shopping mall brought an action

appealed.

The Supreme

Court

reversed

the

The substance of the plaintiffs claim, simply

stated, is that materialman and suppliers of labor have a six
year statute of limitation which begins to run upon discovery of
the cause of action, while architects are relieved from liability
six years after the performance of their services irrespective of
the fact that the cause of action is not discovered until later.
22

What

becomes

a

six

year

statute

for

one

group

necessarily become a six year statute for the other.

does

not

The Court

in Henderson stated as follows:
"The statute under consideration here has set
up a classification whereby architects and
contractors are singled out for protection
not granted to materialman or the suppliers
of labor.
It is difficult to rationally
permit a situation to exist whereby the
supplier of labor and material has a
liability exposure for a period of six years
after the injury has been discovered or, in
the exercise of due care, should have been
discovered when, at the same time, the
designers of the premises can be immunized
from the liability before the cause of action
even occurs or can be factually asserted."
Henderson at 175.
Finally, the court in Henderson vs Edgar Wood, 451 A.2d
17 4

(N.H.

1982)

correctly

reasoned

that

materialman

and

suppliers are part of the same class as architects and builders.
The court held:
"In the construction of an ordinary building,
whether modest or substantial, there are
necessarily involved many differing talents,
services and supplies.
The end product is
the result of collective judgments and
collective efforts.
If there is fault
inherent in the completed structure as a
result of which injury is sustained, it seems
fundamentally fair that all those who
participate in the enterprise should be held
to account for their share of the blame for
any negligent acts performed or defective
materials supplied and thus stand on the same
footing,
rather
than
permit
the
apportionment of blame to be determined by
the fortuity of the timing of the discovery
21

of the
added)

defect."

Id.,

at

175.

(emphasis

Applying the rationale of Henderson, it seems rational
and

sensible

that

architects,

contractors

and

design

professionals along with materialman, suppliers, and owners are
all part of the same class.

They all offer differing talents,

services and supplies and are all working toward the successful
completion of the construction project.
a

home

or

office

building

The end product whether

is the end

result

of

collective

judgments and collective efforts of the individuals.
the

liability

of

design

professionals

at

the

To limit

expense

of

materialman, suppliers, and owners seems fundamentally unfair and
is the type of discrimination that the Utah Const, art. I, § 2
and art. I, § 24 was designed to protect against.
On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court of Utah has
held

a

statute unconstitutional

because

uniformly on the members of a class.

it does not

operate

In State Tax Commission vs.

Department of Finance. 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978) the Court held
the statute unconstitutional because it singled out the State
Insurance Fund from all insurance companies that were found to
be within the same class to pay a special tax.

The Court stated:

"Equal
protection
protects
against
discrimination within a class.
The
legislature has considerable discretion in
the designation of classification that the
Court
must
determine
whether
such
24

classification operate equally on all persons
similarly situated." Id. at 1298.
Furthermore, when persons are similarly situated, it
is unconstitutional to single out one person or group of persons
from

among

a

larger

class

on

the

justification that has little or no merit.
P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984).
480 P.2d

461

basis

of

a

tenuous

Malan vs. Lewis,

693

In Dodgetown, Inc. vs. Romney,

(Utah 1971), this Court held unconstitutional a

Sunday closing law that required only licensed automobile dealers
to close and permitted other business to transact business on
Sunday

because

the

discrimination

failed

to

further

the

legislative purpose of preventing fraud and auto thefts.
Therefore,
amended)

should

be

Utah

Code

found

Ann.

§

78-12-25.5

unconstitutional

(1953

violating

as

equal

protection guarantee's of the Utah Constitution.
POINT V
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH CONST.
ART. 1, § 11 BY DEPRIVING APPELLANT ACCESS TO
THE COURTS AND REDRESS OF INJURIES.
The Utah Const, art. I, § 11 is part of the Declaration
of Rights.

The purpose of this section is to provide all people

access to the courts in order to have redress for injuries.
section states as follows:
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in person, property
25

This

or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this state,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party."
As explained in Berry vs. Beech Air Craft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah
1985), approximately

37 states have constitutional

that are similar to Utah's open court provision.
similar provision under the Federal Constitution.

provisions
There is no

This provision

allows all individuals access to the court based on fairness and
equity.

The framers of the Utah Constitution

intended that

individuals cannot be arbitrarily denied access to the courts
nor be denied remedies that may be obtained therein.
The Utah Supreme Court in Berrv vs. Beech Aircraft, 717
P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) quoted favorably the South Dakota Supreme
Court decision of Dauaaard vs. Baltic Corporative Building Supply
Association, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S. D. 1984) where that court
stated:
"Our constitution is solid core upon which
all our state laws must be premised. Clearly
and unequivocally, our constitution directs
that the courts of this state shall be open
to the injured and oppressed. We are unable
to view this constitutional mandate as a
faint echo to be skirted or ignored.
Our
constitution is free to provide greater
protections for our citizens than are
required under the Federal Constitution. . .
Our constitution has spoken, and it is our
duty to listen."
26

Berry vs. Beech Air Craft. 717 P.2d at 676. (emphasis added)
Likewise, Utah's Constitution is also free to provide
greater protections for itfs citizens than are required under the
Federal Constitution.
In Jackson vs. Mannesmann Demaa Corp., 435 S.2d 725
(Ala. 1983), a person was injured by an electrical arc furnace
and

brought

claims

against

the

corporations

manufacturer's liability doctrine and on negligence.

on

the

The Circuit

Court entered judgment in favor of the defendant corporations
based on the statute of repose regarding improvements to real
estate, and an appeal was taken.

The Supreme Court held that the

statute

§

of

repose,

Ala.

Code

6-5-218,

improvements to real estate, violated

(1975),

Alabama's

regarding
open

court

provision of the State Constitution.
Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), would not allow an action
to be commenced against any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or
the construction of an improvement to real property more than
seven years after the substantial completion of the improvement.
Ala.

Code § 6-5-218,

(1975), is strikingly similar to Utah's

statute of repose being challenged.

Previously, Ala. Code Title

7, § 23(1) (supp. 1973) was the statute which preempted Ala. Code
Section

6-5-218.

Ala.

Code

Title

27

7,

§

23(1)

was

found

unconstitutional in Bagby Elevator Electric Co., vs. McBride, 291
S.2d 306 (Ala. 1974).
down

the seven

The Alabama Supreme Court in Bagby struck

year limitation

as violative

of the Alabama

Constitutional requirement that a bill's title clearly express
its subject and that its body contain only one subject.
In any event, the plaintiff in Jackson v. Mannesmann
Demag Corp. 435 S.2d 725 (Ala. 1983) argued that Ala. Code § 6-5218 (1975) was unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1.

The act violated Ala. Const, art. I, § 13 i.e. the

open court provision.
2.

The act violated the equal protection clauses of

the United States and Alabama Constitutions.
3.

The method of enactment of Ala. Code § 6-5-218

(1975) violated Section 45 of the Alabama Constitution, requiring
that a bill's title clearly express its subject and that its body
only contain one subject.
4.

The act violated the due process clauses of the

United States and Alabama Constitution.
In striking Ala. Code § 6-5-218 (1975) in Jackson, the
Alabama Supreme Court relied on Lankford vs. Sullivan. Long, and
Hagerty, 416 S.2d 996

(Ala. 1982) where the Alabama

Supreme

Court ruled that Alabama's product liability statute of repose
violated the open court provision of the Ala. Const, art. I § 13.
28

The statute in Lankford. which was a statute of repose like the
one at issue here, not only limited the period of time during
which an action could be brought, but also prevented a cause of
action from occurring for injuries caused by products which were
put into use more than ten years before they caused the injury.
Both statutes abolished causes of action theretofore known under
Alabama law.
action

for

The Products Liability Statute abolished causes of
injury

caused

by

products

over

ten

years

old;

Alabama's Architects and Builders Statute abolished actions for
damages caused by defects in improvements to real property if
seven

years

has

expired

from

completion.

The

appellees

in

Jackson vs Mannesmann Demacr Corp. , 435 S.2d 725, 727, 728 (Ala.
1983) point to three grounds which, they argue, support their
contention that Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975) unlike the products
liability statute, was a legitimate exercise of the states police
power and attempt to eradicate a perceived social evil.

Jackson

vs. Mannesmann Demaa Corp., 435 S.2d 725, 727, 728 (Ala. 1983).
First, the appellees argue that buildings and other
structures

have

a

manufactured products.

relatively

long

life

span

vis-a-vis

Therefore, appellees argue, the statute

was a reasonable attempt to limit what might otherwise amount to
an exposure to liability for an unlimited

period of time.

Next, the appellees argued that the longer period of
29

time between the completion of the structure and injury, the
greater the opportunity for some intervening negligence to occur•
Finally, the appellees argued that Ala. Code § 6-5-218
(1975)

protects

against

the

defendants

having

to

mount

the

held

that

defense with "stale evidence."
The

Alabama

Supreme

Court

in Jackson.

neither of the above three arguments advanced by the appellees
were

persuasive.

Supreme
Overland

Court

In response to these three arguments

in Jackson.

cited

favorably

Construction vs. Sirmons, 369 S.2d

the decision
572

the
of

(Fla. 1979)

wherein the Supreme Court of Florida, in striking down a similar
statute as offensive to that state's "open court" provision in
its constitution, replied as follows:
"We recognize the problems which are inherent
in
exposing
builders
and
related
professionals to potential liability for an
indefinite
period of time after
an
improvement to real property has been
completed. Undoubtedly, the passage of time
does aggravate the difficulty of producing
reliable evidence, and it is likely that
advances
in technology tend to push
industries standards inexorably higher. The
impact of these problems, however, is felt by
all litigants. Moreover, the difficulties of
proof would seem to fall at least as heavily
on injured plaintiffs, who must generally
carry the initial burden of establishing that
the defendant was negligent. In any event,
these problems are not unique to the
construction industry, and they are not
sufficiently compelling to justify the
enactment of legislation which, without
30

providing an alternate means of redress,
totally abolishes an injured person's cause
of action.
The legislation impermissively
benefits only one class of defendants, at the
expense of an injured parties right to sue,
and in violation of our constitutional
guarantee of access to court."
Overland Construction vs. Sirmons, 369 S.2d at 574 (Fla. 1979).
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Jackson vs.
Mannesmann

Demaa

Corp..

435

S.2d

725

(Ala.

1983)

further

supported their decision and held as follows:
"We rule that the appellees have failed to
show a substantial relationship between Ala.
Code § 6-5-218 and the eradication of any
social evils sufficient to distinguish this
case from Lankford.
Furthermore, this
statute, like the products liability statute
of repose, has no "savings clause" to provide
parties injured near the expiration of the
seven year period the sufficient time to seek
redress for their injuries. Under our ruling
in Lankford, the failure of such a statute to
make some provision for those injured shortly
before expiration of the limitations makes
the statute arbitrary on its face and can not
be upheld.
Lankford, at 1003-1004.
.Because Ala. Code § 6-5-218 contains the
same constitutional infirmities as the
products liability statute struck down in
Lankford, we deem it unnecessary to discuss
the appellants additional contention."
Jackson at 729.
The same constitutional infirmities found in Berrv vs.
Beech Aircraft. 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985) were also found in
Lankford vs. Sullivan, Long and Hacrerty, 416 S.2d 996 (Ala.
1982).

Likewise, the rational of the Alabama Supreme Court in
31

striking down the Ala. Code § 6-5-218, (1975), is persuasive and
should be followed by this Court in striking down Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended).

Both Alabama and Utah's statute

of repose are similar in their wording and effect.

Both statutes

close the door to litigants before they knew it was opened.
Indeed, since the framers of the Utah Constitution felt that the
courts

of

Utah

should

be

open

to

all

individuals,

this

constitutional provision and guarantee should not be viewed as a
"faint echo".
listen.

The constitution has spoken, and it is our duty to

See also Saylor vs. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973) and

Phillips vs. ABC Builders Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo. 1980) wherein
both

Kentucky

and

Wyoming

found

similar

statutes

of

repose

unconstitutional as a violation of the open court provisions of
their individual state constitutions.
POINT VI
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH
CONST. ART. VI, § 26 FORBIDDING SPECIAL LAWS
OR LEGISLATION
Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 states in part as follows:
11

. . . I n all cases where a general law can
be applicable, no special law shall be
enacted. . ."
In

1980, the

Builders,

Supreme

Inc. .

constitutionality

611
of

Court
P.2d
Wyo.

of Wyoming

in Phillips vs. ABC

821

1980)

Stat.
32

(Wyo.
§

1-3-111,

ruled

on

(1977) which

the
is

Wyoming's Architect and Builder statute of repose.
In Phillips, the plaintiff purchased a home in July
1977, the construction of which was substantially completed on or
about

May

22, 1969.

After

heavy

rains, the basement

and

foundation walls, began to collapse on or about May 25, 1978.
Plaintiffs were forced to vacate the home.

On September 19,

1979, plaintiffs filed a complaint in District Court seeking
damages

from ABC Builders. Inc.. which company

completed the home on or about May 22, 1969.

substantially

The district court

granted ABC Builders motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
statute of limitations had run.

The District Court was reversed

by the Wyoming Supreme Court which held as follows:
"We hold that the statute in question, Wyo.
Stat. § 1-3-111, supra, is not a statute of
limitations, but is a grant of immunity from
suit.
Its immunity is conferred only on a
narrow spectrum of defendants. We hold that
there
is no rational or
reasonable
justification for granting this immunity to
these limited class of persons. Further, we
hold that this statute is a special law which
at least to the extent that no special law
can be made enacted where a general law can
be made applicable.
In this instance, a
general law can be made applicable. The Wyo.
Const., § 7, art. 1 and § 27, art. 3, supra.
Moreover, a statute operates so as to close
courts to individuals who have had dealings
with a protected class in violation of the
Wyo. Const., § 5, art. I, supra."
Phillips vs. ABC Builders, Inc.. 611 P.2d at 831.
The

court

in

Phillips,
33

like

most

courts

striking

similar statutes, cites favorably the seminal of Skinner vs,
Anderson, 213 N.E.2d 588

(111 1967).

The Illinois court in

Skinner found the statute unconstitutional which mirrored the
Wyoming statute.

Both the Wyoming and Illinois statutes in

encompass the essence of Utah statute.
found

the

reasoning

of

Skinner

to

The court in Phillips

be persuasive

also. The

important parts of that decision have been previously discussed
in Point III/ of this brief.
It

is

obvious

that

a

general

law

can

be

made

applicable in Utah.

For example, the State of Oregon enacted a

general

1967, the

statute

in

same

year Utah

Architect and Builder statute of repose.

enacted

their

It states:

"In no event shall any action for negligent
injury to person or property of another be
commenced more than ten years from the date
of the act or omission complained of."
Josephs vs. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 (Or. 1971).
immunity

is

accorded

to

every

alleged

In this statute,

tortfeasor

after

the

passage of ten years.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) grants to
persons such as the defendants a privilege and immunity as to a
particular benefit or advantage denied to other persons, i.e.,
the right to be free from suit after seven years have past from
the completion of any physical improvement to real property.
This immunity is not granted to an owner of real property or any
34

person in control of the property, who makes the improvement.
Any person, firm or corporation that owns property is in the same
class as the architect or builder, but lacks the immunity granted
to the architect or builder.
owner

immunity,

it

also

contribution or indemnity.

The statute not only denies the
denies

the

owner

the

right

to

Constitutional muster can not justify

the special immunity accorded to the protected class but denies
to others similarly

situated.

The cases relied upon, which fail

to find statutes unconstitutional, do not come to grips with the
real problem
class so that

presented; what

factors distinguish

it requires or deserves

immunity

the favored
not accorded

others which appear to be similarly situated. (Kallas Millwork
Corp. vs. Square D Company, 225 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Wis. 1975).
Finally, the business of engaging in a construction
projects is one clothed with a public interest.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) makes no provision which protects
the interest of owners of property.

No reasonable connection is

shown between granting special privileges and immunities involved
in construction projects and denying them to citizens who own
real property upon which improvements are made.
Consequently,

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 78-12-25.5

(1953 as

amended) should be held unconstitutional as a violation of the
Utah Const, art. VI, § 26 forbidding special laws or legislation.
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POINT VII
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 AS AMENDED)
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATING THE UTAH CONST.
ART. VI, § 23 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
REQUIRING THAT ONE SUBJECT BE
CLEARLY
EXPRESSED IN THE STATUTORY TITLE
The Utah Const, art. VI, § 23 states in part:
. . .No bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title."
Appellant maintains that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5

(1953 as

amended) falls far short of advising members of the legislature
or the public that it is not a statute of limitations.
25.5

is

found

property."

under

Article

II

entitled

"other

Section

than

real

Sections 22 through 25 proscribe different statutory

limitations, which are in fact genuine statutes of limitation.
However

Section

25.5

statute of repose.

is not a statute of limitations but a
Section 26 through

normal statutes of limitation.

31.2 are once again

Section 25.5 is placed in the

midst of many statutes of limitation.
The title of Section 25.5 is "Injury Due to Defective
Design or Construction to Real Property-Within Seven Years."

As

stated above, this heading falls far short of advising members of
legislature or the public that Section 25.5 is not a statute of
limitation; that it bars a cause of action before it arises; that
it bars a right of action coming into existence if the accident
36

occurs subsequent to the seven year period.

This language would

lead members of the legislature and the public to believe that
this section would fall within the normal Article II "other than
real property" limitation periods.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5

(1953 as amended) was enacted in 1967 in the midst of a national
lobby effort to limit the exposure of architects, contractors and
related professionals.

In an attempt to limit exposure, the

American

Architects,

Institute

of

the

National

Society

of

Professional Engineers, and the Associated General Contractors of
America lobbied for enactment of statutes limiting the period
subsequent

to the construction

of a given improvement

during

which an action might be brought for injuries allegedly caused by
architects or other construction personnel.

As a result of their

lobbying efforts, numerous states passed statutes associating the
accrual of a cause of action in conclusion of construction rather
than with a result of injury to the plaintiff.

Jackson vs.

Mannesmann Demag Corp.. 435 S.2d 725, 726 (Ala. 1983).
As with the majority of other states, Utah enacted in
1967 the statute that is now being challenged.
cannot

pass

constitutional

muster

since

the

statute must be clearly expressed in the title.

The statute

subject

of

the

State of Utah

vs. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1959), State
vs. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (Utah 1944), and State vs.
37

Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939).
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Baaby Elevator
and Electric Co. Inc. vs. McBride, 291 S.2d

306

(Ala. 1974)

struck a statute which is almost verbatim like the Utah Const.
art. VI, § 23.

The court in McBride, stated as follows with

reference to their constitutional provision that the subject be
"clearly expressed in the title":
"The object of the constitutional provision
has been held to be three fold, first, to
fairly apprise the people, through the
publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation
that are being considered, in order that
they may have the opportunity of being heard
thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desire; second, truly to inform the
members of the legislature who are to vote
upon the bill, what the subject of it is so
that they may not perform that duty,
deceived or ignorant of what they are doing;
and third to prevent the practice of
embracing in one bill several distinct
matters, none of which, perhaps could singly
obtain assent of the legislature, and
procuring its passage by combination of the
minorities in favor of each of the measures,
into a majority that will adopt them all."
Baaby Elevator and Electric Co. Inc. vs. McBride, 291 S.2d at
308.
The title of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5

(1953 as

amended) does not indicate whether it is a traditional statute of
limitation or a statute of repose.
Finally,

the

Supreme
38

Court

in

McBride,

stated

as

follows:
"It seems clear, however, that when the Title
purports to establish a traditional statute
of limitations, but the body in fact does
something different, not merely in degree but
in kind, by declaring, in effect, that no
substantive right to bring an action exists
seven years after a certain event, then the
subject has not been clearly expressed and
the purposes of the Title as established by
this Court have not been met.
Thus, as
applied to causes of action accruing more
than seven years after completion of the
improvement, the act, by virtue of it's
defective title, violates Section 45 of the
State (Alabama) constitution.
McBride, at
309, 310."
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) does
not differentiate from other statutes of limitation contained in
chapter 12.
procedural

Most statutes of limitation deal merely with the
rights,

not

with

eliminating

substantive

rights.

Section 25.5 effectively eliminates many causes of action before
they can actually accrue.
Finally, the Title of Section 25.5 is not any different
than the other statutes of limitations contained in Article II.
That is, all 25.5 states is that the action should be brought
within "seven years."
a

statute

of

Nothing in the title denotes that this is

repose which deals with

substantive

rights as

opposed to a statute of limitations which deals with procedural
rights.

Consequently, the Utah Const, art. VI, § 23

has been

violated since the challenged statute does not clearly express
39

its self in a statutory title.
CONCLUSION
UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT ALLOW
ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS, OR CONTRACTORS TO
SHIELD THEMSELVES WITH IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
There is no reason to treat architects, engineers, or
contractors any different from materialman, suppliers, owners, or
tenants.

All of these individuals play an important role in the

construction of a home, building or improvement to real property.
Here the proximate cause of plaintiff's damages extends
from a defect in either the design, planning or construction of
the Park City cabin.

The report of Arnold W. Coon, P. E., L. S.,

states that the structure was not built according to design
specifications and that the architect could have noticed such
deviations through his periodic inspections.

Utah's statute in

its present form does not promote the building of safe structures
or improvements.
cuts.

It has the opposite effect of encouraging short

Design and planning professionals may take cost saving

measures

which

structure.

are

not

anticipated

in

the

design

of

the

The result can be catastrophic to both life and

property, as it was to the appellant.
Finally, the open court provision of the Utah Const,
art. I, § 11 provides greater protection for its citizens than
required under the Federal Constitution.
40

Our Constitution has

spoken and it is our duty to listen.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft,

717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985).
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff

requests that the District

Court Order of Dismissal be reversed and that Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-25.5 (1953 as amended) be declared unconstitutional on the
above

stated grounds, and that this case be remanded to the

District Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DATED this

< O

of August, 1988.
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING

J. Mark whrimpey
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ADDENDUM 1

INVESTIGATION OF ROOF FAILURE
AT THE
SCHICK-5UN CABIN
NEAR GUARDSMAN PASS
WASATCH COUNTY, UTAH

ARNOLD W. COON, P.E., LS.
FORENSIC ENGINEERING
CONSULTING • STRUCTURAL • INVESTIGATIONS
5330 SOUTH 900 EAST

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117

(801) 262-2666

JUNE 1, 1986
Aetna Insurance Company
445 East 4500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attn: Ross Whitlock
Re: Roof failure at Schick-Sun Cabin near Guardsman Pass, Wasatch
County, Utah. (86045)
Dear Mr. Whitlock;
At your request, I accompanied you, Max Smith (architect), Leon Tanner
(structural engineer) and a contractor in a visit to the above site on
Saturday, May 10, 1986. The following is a brief summary of our findings
to date.
1. The cabin was designed by Max Smith, architect. His structural
consultant was Leon Tanner, with Edmund Allen Engineers. The
plans were drawn in August of 1978. Originally, the cabin had a
partial basement, main floor, mezzanine and roof. An addition
was made to the basement at a later date.
2. The cabin has plan dimensions of 35'-0" by 35'-0". It is divided
into four equal quadrants which are each 17-6" square. An eight
inch square steel tubular column is located at each corner of the
quadrants. At the roof level, a glulam beam is located along each
side of the quadrants. These bear on the steel columns noted
above. The clear distance between the glulam beams was to be
l6*-8 7/8". Joists, which are spaced at 16 " centers, span between the glulam beams. The orientation of the joist spans
changes 90 degrees in adjacent quadrants. The joists are a
patented product which is manufactured by Trus-Joist
Corporation with headquarters in Boise, Idaho. Their product and
service is the "Cadillac" of this type of framing. It consists of a
type of open web truss. The top and bottom chords are made of

wood. The diagonal web members are made of round steel tubes
which are flattened at their ends. The flattened ends fit into
slots which are cut in the chord members. They are permanently
attached with steel pins which are tightly fit into holes in the
wood and holes in the tubes. Two light steel anges are connected
in the end joints of the top chord to provide articulating bearing
seats. Trus-Joist also provides wood bearing plates which are to
be attached to the tops of the supporting beams. These wood
plates have pre-cut slots at the same spacing as the joists.
These slots receive the flattened ends of the end web members
and allow the bearing angles to fit on top of the beam. This
prevents any eccentricity which would cause bending stresses in
the top chord which could cause a failure.
3.

We have included a portion of the plans which were provided by
Trus-Joist for this project. They were careful to provide
dimensional information which was compatible with the
architect's plans and with the fabrication of the joists. The
contractor should have been careful to see that these dimensions
were fully complied with. We have noted the actual dimension on
these plans

4

At the time the cabin was designed, there was no "official" snow
load requirement for Wasatch County. The design snow loads
were left up to the discretion of the structural engineer.
Trus-Joist provided joists which were capable of carrying a
total load of 195 pounds per square foot (psf) with an adequate
factor of safety. They broke the total load into a dead load of 25
psf and a snow load of 170 psf. The actual dead load was closer
to 15 psf. This would give a reserve for a snow load of 180 psf.
Subsequent studies have been unofficially published which give a
design snow load of approximately 190 psf. A new publication is
about ready for issue which may have some minor revisions to
this figure. In any event, it appears that the design loads were
certainly within a reasonable range.

5.

The contractor built the cabin with greater dimensions between
the glulam beams than were called for on the plans. He also
appears to have either left the wood bearing plates off, which
were provided by Trus-Joist, or he did not install them as shown
on the plans. We have included a sketch"which shows how they
should have been installed and another sketch which shows how
they were actually installed. The quadrant which failed was
constructed with 5 5/8" too much span.
This caused
eccentricities in the top chords of the joists which overstressed

them to the point of failure The other three spans were also too
long. Going clockwise around the roof from the failed area, the
excess span lengths are A 7/8", I 1/8" and 5/8".
It is
unconscionable that the contractor allowed this to happen
without calling his discrepancy to someone's attention.
6.

The architect's contract called for him to make periodic visits to
the site to see that the contractor was conforming to the plans.
The problem in the framing was so obvious that it should have
been caught by the architect.

7.

The Building Code requires that two roof drains be provided for
each draianage area unless scuppers are installed at the walls to
prevent the ponding of water on the roof. The architect provided
two roof drains; however, he failed to recognize that a "dead
flat" roof deflects under load and causes areas which are lower
than those over the supporting beams The roof framing also
develops some "creep" which causes permanent deflections and
low areas which do not drain adequately to the two drains which
were provided. Thus, in some areas, greater loads cause greater
deflections which in turn create areas of greater load which
cause greater deflections, etc. This may have contributed a
little to the failure. It would be advisable to put at least one
roof drain at the low point of each quadrant.

CONCLUSIONS
1.

The primary cause of failure was the contractor's lack of
precision in constructing the building to the dimensions shown
on the plans which were prepared both by the architect and the
supplier of the joists.

2.

The architect should have caught the contractor's errors during
his inspections of the construction.

3.

Of lesser concern is the fact that the architect did not provide
enough roof drains at the low points of the roof to properly take
care of deflections and creep.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

Remove the cei 1 ing paneling and insulation as necessary.

2.

Replace the joists which have failed.

3.

Properly attach new ledgers, with slots for the joist web
members, to the sides of the existing glulam beams to provide
support for the remaining joists.

4.

Install new roof drains as noted above.

5.

Reinstall the insulation and ceiling panels.

The above work should be designed, coordinated and inspected by the
original architect and structural engineer.
If we may be of further service to you, please let us know.

Arnold W. Coon, P.E., L S , ACEC
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FORCES INTERSECT AT A COMMON POINT
NO ECCENTRICITY IN TOP CHORD

PRE-NOTCHED PLATE
BY TRUS-JOIST
REACTION

GLULAMBEAM

END DETAIL AS DESIGNED
ECCENTRICITY CAUSES TOP CHORD BENDING

END DETAIL AS BUILT

DESCRIPTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Photo No.

Description

1.

View looking upward at the roof framing. The ceiling and
insulation have been removed. Every Trus-Joist end failed
where it was attached to the glulam beam which is shown.
The roof sheathing acted as a suspension system and
prevented a total collapse.

2.

This is a view looking parallel to the glulam beam which is
shown on Photo 1. Each joist end has failed at the top
chord end pin.

3.

This is a view of the condition at the opposite end of the
joists shown on Photos 1 and 2. Some failures occurred
at this end of the joists also. This joist end did not fail
but it shows the condition of installation. The red arrow
points to the steel bearing angle which did not bear on the
glulam due to an excessive span between the glulams.

4.

This is a view of the condition at the opposite end of the
joists shown on Photos 1 and 2. Some failures occurred
at this end of the joists also. This joist end did not fail
but it shows the condition of installation. The red arrow
points to the steel bearing angle which did not bear on the
glulam due to an excessive span between the glulams.

5. thru 9.

These is are views of typical ends which failed. The green
arrows point to the pin locations in the top chord pieces
which are still bearing on the glulam beam. The red
arrows point to the pins which are still connected to a
piece of the top chord which separated from the locations
shown with the red arrows. The orange arrows point to
the steel bearing angles which did not bear on the glulam
beam.

10. and I I .

These are views in two of the other quadrants where there
were no failures. The green arrows point to the steel
bearing angles which do not fit the glulam beams as they
should due to the increased clear span between the beams.
The red arrows point to what appear to be the slotted
wood plates which were provided by Trus-Joist.

ADDENDUM 2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL LITCHFIELD,

:

Plaintiff,

:
MEMORANDUM DECISION

VS.
CIVIL NO. C 87-6238
JERRY CUTSHAW, individually dba :
INTERIORS CONTRACTING, MAX J.
SMITH, an individual, and MAX
:
J. SMITH AND ASSOCIATES, INC,,
a Utah corporation,
:
Defendants.

:

Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss was orally argued on the 10th
day of December 1987.

Plaintiff was represented by J. Mark

Whimpey

Interior

and

defendants

Contracting,

Cutshaw were represented by Thomas R. Grisley.

Inc.

and

Jerry

Defendants Max J.

Smith and Associates, Inc. and Max J. Smith were represented by
James A. Murphy.

Defendants1 motion was taken under advisement

pending the filing of additional memoranda.

The court after

receiving the supplemental memoranda held an informal hearing
with counsel in chambers.

Counsel was advised orally of the

court's decision and that a brief written Memorandum Decision
would be mailed to counsel.
renders the following decision.

Based on the foregoing the court

LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAW, ET AL

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The questions to be resolved in this case are whether or not
the plaintiff is precluded from bringing this action pursuant to
the provisions of 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended and if said
section is constitutional.
There is no dispute that the cabin that suffered a roof
failure had been constructed and occupied for more than seven
years and the complaint was not filed within the seven year
statutory period.
Section 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. 1953 as amended reads as follows:
Injury due to defective design or construction
improvement to real property - within seven years.
No action to recover damages for any injury
to property, real or personal, or for any
injury to the person, or for bodily injury or
wrongful death, arising out of the defective
and unsafe condition of an improvement to
real property, nor any action for damages
sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, supervision
of construction or construction of such
improvement to real property more than seven
years after the completion of construction.
*

*

*

(2) Completion of construction for
the purpose of this act shall mean
the date of issuance of
certificate of substantial completion by
the owner, architect, engineer or
other agents, or the date of the
owners use or possession of the
improvement on the real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision
shall not apply to any person in actual
possession and control as owner, tenant or
otherwise, of the improvement at the time the
defective and unsafe condition of such
improvement constitutes the proximate cause
of the injury for which it is proposed to
bring in action.

of

LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAW, ET AL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

This provision shall not be construed as
extending or limiting the periods otherwise
prescribed by the laws of this state for the
bringing of any action.
The language of Section 78-12-25.5 is rather ambiguous but
the case of Good v. Christensen, 527 P2d 223 (Utah) attempts to
interpret the language pertaining to the exception contained in
said section.
According to the Good v. Christensen xuling the owner or
person in actual possession cannot bring an action against the
architect or contractor if more than seven years from the date of
completion has expired.
that

the

potential

The net effect of this interpretation is

liability

for

a

dangerous

condition

of

premises is left on the owner or the person in possession if
injury is caused by circumstances that normally give rise to a
cause of action.
The case of Salesian Society v. Formigli Corporation, 295
A.2d 19 (1972) cited by Justice Ellett in the Good v. Christensen
case in support of the Utah Supreme Court's decision explains in
greater

detail

the

rational

for the upholding

a seven year

statute repose and the reasons for such a statute being deemed
constitutional.
The court concludes that the plaintifffs action be dismissed
as against these defendants because of Good v. Christensen and
for the reasons set forth in defendants1 memorandum.
the court believes that the plaintiffs
merit.

case

However,

is not without

The court has reservations about its ruling but will

LITCHFIELD V. CUTSHAW, ET AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

follow precedent of the present Utah case law.

Dated this

//

day of February, 1988.

^£JL- A (IZLL
^ - J U D G E JOHN A . ROKICH

Copies mailed to counsel.

THOMAS R. 0RISIJY (3802) of
B J I i r , HASLAM A HATCH
Atturnpvs f or Defendants
W r y Cut^haw and Interiors Contracting
50 West Broadway. 4th Floor
Sail Lake C i t y , f
* 41 0?
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
HI AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL LICHTEFELD,
Plaintiff,

vs
CUTSHAW, individually and
NTSSCONTRACTING MAX,
SMITH, an Individual, and MAX J.
SMITH AND ASSOCIATES, INC., a
Utah corporation.
Defendants.
ITDRY

ORDER OF DISMISSAL RE:
DEFENDANTS JERRY CUTSHAW,
individually and dba INTERIORS
CONTRACTING, MAX J. SMITH, an
individual, and MAX J. SMITH AND
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
corporation

R

Civil No. C87-06238
Honorable John A. Rokich

The Court havinq heard Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on December
1987- having reviewed the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
and the Supplemental Memorandum in the Court's file;

having issued a

orandum Decision dated February 11, 1988, and based upon the reasoning
set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED:
n fondants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.
r tshaw

Defendants. Jerry

individually and dba Interiors Contracting, Max J. Smith, an

• M id al and Max J. Smith and Associates, Inc-, a Utah corporation, are

ro*

dismissed from the above-captioned matter, and Plaintiff's
th^se Defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this _^

day of J ^ ^ L ^ . 1988.
BY THE COURT

vC-4
„.
JohnA. Rokich
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Approved as to Form & Content:
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
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ADDENDUM 4

Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

A R T . I, § 2

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH

lee. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free government!
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit,
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public
welfare may require.

A R T . I, § 11

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay;
and no person shall he barred from prosecuting or defending before
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which
he is a party.

ART. VI, § 23
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 23. [Bill to contain only one subject.]
Except general appropriation bills, and bills for tlie codification and
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ART. I, § 24

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
ART. VI, § 26

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 26. [Enumeration of private laws forbidden.]
The Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws
in the following cases:
1. Granting divorce.
2. Changing the names of persons or places, or constituting one person
the heir-at-law of another.
3. Locating or changing county scats.
4. Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of Justices of the Peace.
5. Punishing crimes and misdemeanors.
6. Regulating the practice of courts of justice.
7. Providing for a change of venue in civil or criminal actions.
8. Assessing and collecting taxes.
9. Regulating the interest on money.
10. Changing the law of descent or succession.
11. Regulating county and township affairs.
12. Incorporating cities, towns or villages; changing or amending the
charter of any city, town or village; laying out, opening, vacating or
altering town plats, highways, streets, wards, alleys or public grounds.
13. Providing for sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors
or others under disability.
14. Authorizing persons to keep ferries across streams within the State.
15. Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures.
16. Granting to an individual, association or corporation any privilege,
immunity or franchise.
17. Providing for the management of common schools.
18. Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances
of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected or
appointed.
The Legislature may repeal any existing special law relating to the
foregoing subdivisions.
In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall
be enacted.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to deny or restrict the
power of the Legislature to establish and regulate the compensation and
fees of county and township officers; to establish and regulate the rates
of freight, passage, toll and charges of railroads, toll roads, ditch, flume

78-12-25.5. Injury due to defective design or construction
of improvement to real property — Within seven
years.
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or
for any injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out
of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor
any action for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought
against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property more
than seven years after the completion of construction.
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or any
other legal entity.
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall mean
the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use
or possession of the improvement on real property.
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person in
actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the improvement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improvement
constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed to bring
an action.
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the periods
otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action.
History; C 1953* 78-12-25.5, enacted by L.
1967, ch. 218, S 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The term "this
act," referred to in Subsection (2), means Laws
'

1967, Chapter 218, which appears as this secCroae-Referencea. — Product Liability Act,
statute of limitations, § 78-15-3
Wrongful death, §§ 78-11-6, 78-11-7.
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